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Abstract—Link prediction is one of the fundamental problems
in social network analysis. A common set of techniques for link
prediction rely on similarity metrics which use the topology of
the observed subnetwork to quantify the likelihood of unobserved
links. Recently, similarity metrics for link prediction have been
shown to be vulnerable to attacks whereby observations about
the network are adversarially modified to hide target links. We
propose a novel approach for increasing robustness of similarity-
based link prediction by endowing the analyst with a restricted
set of reliable queries which accurately measure the existence of
queried links. The analyst aims to robustly predict a collection
of possible links by optimally allocating the reliable queries. We
formalize the analyst’s problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game
in which they first choose the reliable queries, followed by an
adversary who deletes a subset of links among the remaining
(unreliable) queries by the analyst. The analyst in our model is
uncertain about the particular target link the adversary attempts
to hide, whereas the adversary has full information about the
analyst and the network. Focusing on similarity metrics using
only local information, we show that the problem is NP-Hard for
both players, and devise two principled and efficient approaches
for solving it approximately. Extensive experiments with real and
synthetic networks demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
Index Terms—Social network analysis, link prediction, adver-
sarial robustness, game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of massive social network datasets has led
to the widespread use of Social Network Analysis (SNA) tools.
For instance, centrality measures are used to identify important
individuals [5], while link prediction aims to uncover hidden
or missing connections within the network [14]. At the high
level, such SNA tools extract knowledge from the observed
network data, and the reliability of SNA critically relies on
the veracity of these observed data.
However, network data collection (which subsequently
grounds SNA) is not necessarily reliable. Many modes of data
collection are error-prone, including field surveys (which may
suffer from imperfect participant recall) and digitally collected
data (such as social media, in which “friends” may both
exclude actual friends, and include people who have never
met one another). In addition to such non-adversarial noise
in data collection, many SNA settings introduce incentives
for individuals to deliberately subvert network analysis by
tampering with the data collection process. For example,
suppose that law enforcement is investigating a crime network
and collecting information about this network from personal
interviews. The criminals may either themselves provide mis-
leading information, or intimidate others to do so.
The systematic investigation of the latter problem of ad-
versarial social network analysis has received some attention
from the attacker’s perspective in recent literature, with several
approaches developed for defeating analysis techniques such
as centrality analysis, community detection [22], link predic-
tion [23], [25], and node classification [26]. However, there
have been scarcely any approaches investigating how to make
SNA robust to such attacks. We propose the first approach
for robust similarity-based link prediction—a core problem in
social network analysis—in the presence of adversarial edge
deletion.
We begin by modeling network data collection as follows.
The analyst submits a set of node-pair queries to the envi-
ronment which returns edge or non-edge in response to each
query, corresponding to the assessment whether a queried
pair of nodes are connected. This is an abstraction of most
data collection approaches, such as field interviews, phone
call monitoring (in criminal cases), etc. Based on the query
results, we assume that the analyst will construct a subgraph
and use a similarity metric to assess the likelihood of the
existence of target edges that are not in the set of queries.
In our setting, an attacker can modify the query results by
changing edge to non-edge (equivalently, delete edges from the
observed subgraph) for a limited subset of queries in order to
hide a target link. In our running criminal network example,
the criminals would intimidate some of the interviewees to
not disclose existing relationships known to these. To counter
such attacks, we assume that the analyst can make a subset of
their queries reliable. For example, they may elicit a particular
relationship through multiple interviews as well as other means
(such as monitoring communications), significantly reducing
the likelihood that an existing link is successfully hidden.
We model the interaction between the analyst and the
attacker as a non-zero-sum Bayesian Stackelberg game in
which the defender (analyst) first commits to a set of reliable
queries, and the attacker chooses the set of links they will
delete after observing the analyst’s decision. The Bayesian
nature of this game captures the uncertainty of the analyst
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about both the network itself, and the attacker’s preference
about which link they wish to hide. We are interested in
finding the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium of this game. We
show that for all local similarity metrics finding the attacker’s
best response in this game is NP-hard, with the difficulty
arising from the nature of tie-breaking. We then propose two
principled algorithms to approximate the defender’s optimal
commitment strategy in the Stackelberg game, one that casts
an approximate version of the problem as an integer linear
program, and another that identifies the set of critical links
that the attacker is likely to delete and associates each link
with an estimate of damage to the defender.
We conduct extensive experiments on several random graph
models as well as real networks. We show, surprisingly, that
the attack will not always harm the defender—by virtue of
this being a non-zero-sum game, there are instances when the
attack may actually increase the defender’s utility. In the more
typical cases where the attack will decrease the defender’s
utility, our proposed heuristic algorithm dramatically reduces
the damage with only a small proportion of reliable queries.
We also show that it is not always useful to have more
reliable queries, if they are not carefully chosen: in particular,
increasing the number of randomly chosen reliable queries
may at times decrease the defender’s utility.
II. RELATED WORK
Link prediction, as formulated by Liben-Nowell and Klein-
berg [14], considers the problem of predicting hidden or
missing links based on the network structure as well as other
side information. An important line of work in link prediction
focuses on the design of node pair similarity metrics [16], [21],
with the view that a higher similarity score for a pair indicates
a greater likelihood of the existence of a link. Such similarity
metrics are commonly classified as neighbor-based [11], path-
based [7], [15], and random-walk-based [4], depending on the
information used.
Recently, much effort has been devoted to analyzing the
vulnerability of social network analysis methods to adversarial
manipulation. For example, Waniek et al. [22] study the
vulnerability of centrality measures, which are indicators of
the importance of individuals or groups within a network,
to adversarial manipulation. Specifically for link prediction,
authors in [23] and [25] study how attackers can lower the
similarities among target links perceived by a network analyst,
thus evading link prediction, by modifying network topology.
Zhang et al. [24] experimentally analyzed the robustness of
several similarity metrics in link prediction to random noise.
While prior efforts primarily focus on attacking link prediction
algorithms, there is scarcely any systematic analysis of how
to make link prediction approaches robust to attack, which is
the subject of our work.
There are also related works in the realm of adversarial
machine learning [20], specifically on attacking representation
learning approaches (based on, e.g., random walk [17] or graph
convolutional networks [9]) over network data. However, such
works mainly focus on the attacks of some separate learning
tasks, such as node classification [26], [27]. To the best of our
knowledge, the attacks explicitly designed for such learning
based link prediction approaches are still unknown.
Game theory has been extensively used in security domains
to model and analyze the behavior of defenders and attackers
in adverse situations. In an important class of Stackelberg
game models [3], [10] the defender first commits to a defense
strategy, and the attacker then observes this commitment
decision and optimally responds. The typical solution concept
for such games is the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium [10],
in which the attacker breaks ties in the defender’s favor.
Such a framework naturally fits in many real-world situations,
demonstrating considerable success in both theory and practice
[19]. Bayesian Stackelberg Games [6], [8] are an extension
of this framework in which the attacker has an informational
advantage, providing a natural modeling approach for our
setting.
III. SIMILARITY-BASED LINK PREDICTION
The key idea behind similarity-based link prediction is to
assess the likelihood of the existence of the link between a pair
of nodes by calculating how topologically similar these nodes
are. While a large variety of similarity metrics are used in
different prediction systems, we focus on a category of metrics
termed local metrics. For these, the similarity Sim(u, v|G)
between two nodes u and v given an observed subgraph G
only depends on “two-hop” information about u and v: their
neighbors and neighbors’ neighbors. As a result, local metrics
are easy to compute and do not require global information
about the network.
TABLE I: List of representative similarity metrics. Specifi-
cally, N(u, v) denotes the set of common neighbors of u and
v and d(u) denotes the degree of a node u.
Local Metrics Sim(u, v)
SLM
Adamic-Adar
∑
w∈N(u,v)
1
log d(w)
Resource Allocation
∑
w∈N(u,v)
1
d(w)
Common Neighbours |N(u, v)|
Jaccard |N(u,v)|
d(u)+d(v)−|N(u,v)|
Sørensen 2|N(u,v)|
d(u)+d(v)
ASLM
Salton |N(u,v)|√
d(u)d(v)
Hub Promoted |N(u,v)|
min(d(u),d(v))
Hub Depressed |N(u,v)|
max(d(u),d(v))
Leicht-Holme-Newman |N(u,v)|
d(u)d(v)
We list the metrics considered in this paper in Table I, which
cover most of the popular metrics for link prediction. We find
it useful to classify them as Symmetric Local Metrics (SLM)
and Asymmetric Local Metrics (ASLM), as defined below in
Section VI-B.
IV. ROBUST LINK PREDICTION MODEL
In our model, a network analyst (defender) faces an attacker
whose goal is to hide certain links.
A. Defense & Attack Models
While much of prior literature on link prediction is not
explicit about how network data is acquired, modeling data
acquisition is crucial for a principled approach to robust link
prediction. We model the data collection process as follows.
An analyst collects observations about the network via a set
of queries Q = {(ui, uj)} to the environment (which is a
proxy for actual data collection; for example, field interviews,
communication monitoring, etc.), where each (ui, uj) stands
for a pair of nodes. The environment responds with “edge” if
(ui, uj) ∈ Q is indeed an edge in the underlying network and
with a “non-edge” otherwise. Again, query response here is
an abstraction; for example, it would correspond to an answer
of a survey subject whether individuals i and j are friends.
Since data collection is costly, the number of such queries is
limited. Hence, given the partial graph GQ constructed with Q,
the analyst employs link prediction algorithms to find whether
there exist some other links in the network that have not been
identified so far. Formally, the analyst wants to predict the
existence of links among a set of node pairs, denoted by
HD = {(vi, vj)}, that do not appear in the observed network.
Naturally, we assume (vi, vj) /∈ Q, for any (vi, vj) ∈ HD,
since otherwise the existence of this edge is directly observed.
We refer to HD as a target set of the analyst.
We assume that the analyst uses similarity-based link pre-
diction, i.e., she computes a similarity score Sim(vi, vj |GQ)
between a pair of nodes (vi, vj) ∈ HD based on the observed
subgraph GQ. When clear from context, we often write the
similarity metric simply as Sim(vi, vj). We assume that the
analyst will predict that the link between vi and vj exists iff
Sim(vi, vj) ≥ θ, where θ is a pre-defined threshold.
The attacker aims to hide a target connection HA = (V1, V2)
from the network analyst. Specifically, the attacker attempts to
minimize the similarity score Sim(V1, V2|GQ) by modifying
the results of a subset of the queries Q, following the model
proposed by Zhou et al [25]. We restrict the attacker’s ability
to changing edges in Q into non-edges, which is equivalent
to deleting a subset of edges in GQ. In practice, this can
be achieved by making the existing links difficult to observe
or measure (e.g., blocking communication channels, limiting
communication, intimidating witnesses, etc.). Since deleting
links is typically costly (e.g., the connection between nodes
comes from an actual need to communicate), we impose a
constraint that the attacker can delete at most kA links. Let the
set of links removed by the attacker be denoted by SA ⊆ Q.
The graph constructed by the analyst after the attack then
becomes ĜQ = GQ − SA.
We assume that the attacker knows the structure of the
underlying graph G, as well as the defender’s target set HD,
modeling an informationally powerful attacker.1
To defend against the attack, we assume that the analyst
can make a subset of queries Q reliable in the sense that
the associated link information is accurately measured despite
1In fact, it suffices in our case for the attacker to only know local network
structure for the target edge HA, which is informationally quite plausible.
adversarial tampering. For example, the analyst of a covert
network can decide to devote sufficient resources (such as a
background check, private investigation, etc.) to measure the
connection between two nodes reliably. Let SD ⊆ Q denote
the set of reliable queries chosen by the defender. Clearly,
reliably measuring links can be quite costly, and the analyst
therefore faces a budget constraint that |SD| ≤ kD for an
exogenously specified number of reliable queries kD she can
make. For a combination of decisions (SD, SA) by the analyst
and the attacker about reliable queries and edges to remove,
respectively, the observed subgraph becomes ĜQ = GQ−SA \
SD, where SA \ SD = {(ui, uj) ∈ SA|(ui, uj) /∈ SD}.
B. Bayesian Stackelberg Game Formulation
At the high level, we have an adversarial situation, where
the analyst attempts to distribute her budget of reliable queries
within Q so as to make link prediction vis-a-vis the target set
of links HD robust against link removal attacks. To formalize
this, we model the interaction between the analyst and the
attacker as a Bayesian Stackelberg game. In this game, the
analyst first chooses the set SD of reliable queries. The
attacker then observes SD, and chooses the set of edges SA
to remove from GQ (equivalently, the set of query answers
to flip from “edge” to “non-edge”). Crucially, the analyst is
uncertain about both HA (the attacker’s target link to hide) and
the true network G (as well as the derived subnetwork), which
are both known to the attacker. We denote by t = (HA,G)
the attacker’s type or private information, upon which they
can condition the choice of SA. Suppose that the analyst
has a prior distribution P over attacker’s types t. Let the
utilities of the attacker and the defender in the game given
joint decisions (SD, SA) and attacker type t be uA(SD, SA; t)
and uD(SD, SA; t), respectively. The attacker can condition
their strategy on both their type t and the observation of the
analyst’s strategy SD; we represent it as a function g(SD; t).
We are now ready to formally define the Strong Stackelberg
equilibrium of the Bayesian Stackelberg game above.
Definition 1. The strategy profile 〈S∗D, g∗〉 forms a Strong
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) of the Bayesian Stackelberg
game if they satisfy the following:
• The defender plays a best response: ∀ SD,
Et∼P [uD(S∗D, g∗(S∗D; t); t)] ≥ Et∼P [uD(SD, g∗(SD; t); t)].
• The attacker plays a best response for each type t:
uA(SD, g
∗(SD; t); t) ≥ uA(SD, g(SD; t); t), ∀SD, g.
• The attacker breaks ties optimally for the defender for
each type t: ∀S∗D, g ∈ G(S∗D; t), where G(S∗D; t) is the
set of attacker’s best responses to S∗D for attacker type t,
uD(S
∗
D, g
∗(S∗D; t); t) ≥ uD(S∗D, g(S∗D; t); t).
We now specialize the Bayesian Stackelberg game model to
our problem by defining the utilities of both players. First, re-
call that the goal of the attacker is to minimize the similarity of
a target link HA. Consequently, uA(SD, SA; t) = −Sim(HA).
To define the utility of the analyst, we begin by quantifying
the quality of link prediction. Let the loss of a prediction on a
specific node pair (vi, vj) be l(Sim(vi, vj)|θ, yij), where θ is a
pre-defined threshold, yij = 1 indicates that (vi, vj) is indeed
an edge in the underlying graph and yij = −1 otherwise. We
do not assume a specific form of loss functions in our model as
long as the loss is increasing in the similarity when yij = −1
and vise versa. Then the total loss to the analyst is
L(SD, HD|θ,G, HA) =
∑
(vi,vj)∈HD
l(Sim(vi, vj |ĜQ)|θ, yij)
= −uD(SA, SD), (1)
where ĜQ = GQ−g(SD; (HA,G))\SD, with GQ a restriction
of the graph G to the node pairs in Q; note the explicit
dependence here of the attacker’s strategy on the analyst’s,
as well as on their type. Of course, in order to compute
the analyst’s loss function, they need to know two additional
pieces, the graph G and HA, which, as we may recall, jointly
comprise the attacker’s type t distributed according to P . Thus,
the analyst’s actual expected loss function is
L¯(SD, HD|θ) = E(G,HA)∼P [L(SD, HD|θ,G, HA)].
The analyst’s utility is then the negative expected loss.
In our analysis, we use the sample average to approximate
the expected loss. Specifically, we use a collection of K
samples S = {(Gi, HiA}Ki=1, and use the average loss over
these samples as the objective:
L˜(SD, HD|θ) = 1
K
∑
(Gi,HiA)∈S
L(SD, HD|θ,Gi, HiA). (2)
To simplify notation, we henceforth write g(SD;GiQ, HiA)
as SiA, omitting the dependence on SD where it is evident
from the context.
Computing the SSE of our Bayesian Stackelberg game (with
respect to the approximate loss function above) then amounts
to solving the following bi-level optimization problem (omit-
ting the constant 1/K factor from the objective and abusing
notation slightly to make the dependence of the loss function
on the attack strategy SiA explicit):
arg min
SD
∑
(Gi,HiA)∈S
L(SD, HD|θ,GiQ − Si∗A \ SD)
s.t. |SD| ≤ kD,
Si∗A = arg min
SiA:|SiA|≤kA
Sim(HiA|ĜiQ), ∀ i.
(3)
We aim to find the analyst’s optimal solution to Problem (3).
V. COMPLEXITY
Recent work showed that maximizing the attacker’s utility
is computationally efficient if we are not concerned about tie-
breaking [25]. However, we now show that in our setting,
where tie-breaking is a crucial aspect of the SSE equilibrium
concept, even computing a best response for the attacker is
hard.
Theorem 1. Given SD, computing the attacker’s best response
that breaks ties in the defender’s favor is NP-hard for all local
similarity metrics listed in Table I.
Proof. Given a target pair (V1, V2), the attacker can identify a
set of tuples {(V1, wi, V2)}|N(V1,V2)|i=1 . His goal is to choose a
proper partition of the common neighbors {wi} = W1 ∪W2:
for wi ∈W1 he will delete edge (V1, wi) and for wj ∈W2 he
will delete (V2, wj). We assumed that none of the critical edges
belongs to SD; otherwise, there is no need for the attacker to
choose which one of (V1, wi) and (V2, wi) to delete.
We use the Common Neighbors as an example and the
proof can be extended to other local metrics straightforwardly.
As proved in [25], the optimal strategy for the attacker
(without considering tie-breaking) is to delete either (V1, wi)
or (wi, V2) for each wi. That is, any partition is a best response
in minimizing Sim(V1, V2). However, different partitions will
result in different utilities of the defender.
Let HD = {(ui, uj)}. We focus on a special case of the
problem where all target links in HD are non-edges and any
node in HD is a common neighbor of V1 and V2. Then,
minimizing the loss on HD is equivalent to minimizing the
sum of similarities of all node pairs (ui, uj) in HD, denoted
as SH =
∑
(ui,uj)∈HD Sim(ui, uj). Thus, for the attacker,
finding the best response breaking ties in the defender’s favor
is equivalent to finding a partition that minimizes SH . We
consider the decision problem termed PA: can the attacker
find a partition such that SD = ka?
We use the decision version of the maximum cut (MaxCut)
for the reduction, which is known to be NP-complete. Given
a graph G = (U,E), a cut is a partition of the nodes V into
two disjoint subsets S and T . The cut-set is then the set of
edges where each edge has one end-node in S and the other
one in T . The size of the cut-set is the number of edges in
the set. MaxCut is to decide whether there is a cut such that
the size of the cut set if at most k.
Given an instance of MaxCut (G = (U,E), k), we construct
an instance of PA as follows. We first construct a graph H
where each node ui ∈ U is also a node in H . We then add
two nodes V1 and V2 and connect every ui with both V1 and
V2. Let (ui, uj) be a target link in HD if and only if (ui, uj)
is an edge in G. Then the problem PA is to decide whether
there is a partition of U such that SD = ka = |E| − k. We
show that MaxCut and PA are equivalent.
Fig. 1: Example: construction of H from G in MaxCut.
First, we show that if we can find a cut in graph G with size
at least k, then we can find a partition of the nodes U in graph
H such that SD = |E|−k. Suppose the cut in graph G is S and
T with size k and the number of edges with both end-nodes in
S (respectively T ) is s (respectively t). Then in graph H, the
attacker will delete all links (ui, V1) for ui ∈ S and delete all
links (uj , V2) for uj ∈ T . Now consider any target (ui, uj). If
ui and uj belong to different partitions (for example, ui ∈ S
and uj ∈ T ), the similarity Sim(ui, uj) = 0 as there is no
common neighbors between ui and uj due to the deletion
of links. If ui and uj belong to the same partition S, then
Sim(ui, uj) = 1 as they share only one common neighbor V2.
As there are s edges with both end-nodes in S in graph G, we
know there are s target links in the partition S in graphH, each
with similarity 1. Similarly, we know there are t target links in
T each with similarity 1. Thus SD = s+ t = |E|−k. That is,
we found a partition S and T of the nodes (which corresponds
to a way of deleting edges) such that SD = |E| − k.
Second, we show that if we find a partition of nodes in
graph H such that SD ≤ |E| − k, then we found a cut of
size at least k. Let the partition be S and T and the attacker
delete all links (ui, V1) for ui ∈ S and all links (uj , V2) for
uj ∈ T . Consider a target link (ui, uj) in HD. If ui and uj
belong to different partitions, then Sim(ui, uj) = 0. If ui and
uj belong to the same partition, we have Sim(ui, uj) = 1. As
SD = |E| − k, we know there are |E| − k such target links
that the end-nodes belong to the same partition (either S or
T ). Let S and T be a cut in graph G. Since each target link
in HD corresponds to an edge in G, we have the number of
edges with both end-nodes in the same partition is |E| − k.
By definition, the size of the cut is k. That is, if we find a
partition of nodes in graph H such that SD ≤ |E| − k, then
we found a cut of size at least k.
It is an immediate consequence that the problem of com-
puting the SSE of our game is hard: simply let kD = 1 (in this
case, the problem is equivalent to computing the attacker’s best
response part of the SSE). Given that computing an optimal
solution efficiently is out of the question, in what follows, we
present principled approaches for computing an approximately
optimal SSE strategy for the analyst.
VI. SOLUTION APPROACH
At the high level, our approach makes an assumption
that the damages caused by deleting links are approximately
independent, which significantly simplifies the attack. Under
this assumption, we show that the attacker’s best response that
breaks ties in the defender’s (analyst’s) favor can be found
efficiently for all local metrics. Based on this, we then compute
an approximately optimal defender strategy.
A. Independent Damage Approximation
In essence, the hardness of finding the attacker’s best
response that breaks ties in favor of the defender comes
from the fact that the effects of deleting each link are inter-
dependent. That is, the damage to the defender caused by
deleting a particular link is determined by the states (either
deleted or not) of other links. To make the problem tractable,
we make the approximation that deleting a link will cause a
damage which is independent of the states of other links. Our
experiments subsequently demonstrate the effectiveness of this
approach.
Given the independence assumption, the results of Zhou et
al. [25] imply that for a sample (Gi, HiA), the attacker will
only delete links connecting V i1 or V
i
2 with their common
neighbors. Specifically, the attacker will identify a subgraph
GiA of Gi consisting of tuples (V i1 , wij , V i2 ), where wij are
common neighbors of V i1 and V
i
2 . Denote the set of common
neighbors by W i = {wij}N
i
j=1, where N
i = |N(V i1 , V i2 )|.
Let cijr (r ∈ {1, 2}) denote the damage caused by deleting
link (V ir , w
i
j), which is the change in the defender’s loss
L(SD, HD|θ,Gi)−L(SD, HD|θ,Gi−{(V ir , wij)}\SD). Thus
for each sample (Gi, HiA), the attacker can extract a weighed
sub-graph GiA, termed damage graph, with each edge (V ir , wij)
associated with a damage cijr. Then under the independent
damage assumption, the total damage Ci caused by the attack
is the summation of the damages cijr corresponding to the
deleted links: Ci =
∑
(V ir ,w
i
j)∈SiA c
i
jr.
We note that each individual damage cijr could be zero, pos-
itive, or negative. That is, the attack could possibly decrease
the defender’s loss, which reflects the non-zero-sum nature of
the game between the attacker and defender. This is because
deleting links could either increase or decrease the similarity
score of a node pair in the defender’s target set, which further
will increase or decrease the defender’s loss depending on the
state (edge or non-edge) of that link.
B. Computing Attacker’s Best Response
We seek to compute the attacker’s best response that breaks
ties in favor of the defender under the independent damage
assumption. We model strong attackers by assuming that kiA =
|N(V i1 , V i2 )|.
We begin by considering attacker’s strategy without con-
sidering tie-breaking. For an arbitrary sample (G, HA) and
its corresponding damage graph GA, the results in [25] show
that the attacker would not delete the two links connecting
to the same common neighbor simultaneously. Instead, he
will choose one of (V1, wj) and (V2, wj) to delete for each
wj . Now, consider a tuple (V1, wj , V2). If both (V1, wj) and
(wj , V2) are “protected” (i.e., reliably queried) by the defender,
the attacker cannot delete either edge. If one of (V1, wj)
and (wj , V2) is protected, the attacker will delete the other
unprotected edge. Thus, the only non-trivial attacker decision
is to select which one of (V1, wj) and (wj , V2) to delete
when both of them are unprotected. For convenience, we
term such edges critical edges. We assume that there are k′A
(k′A ≤ |N(V1, V2)|) pairs of critical edges, among which the
attacker will delete k1 critical edges connecting to V1 and k2
connecting to V2 (k1 + k2 = k′A).
Based on the results in [25], we classify the local met-
rics into Symmetric and Asymmetric metrics depending on
the attacker’s strategy in deleting critical edges. Specifically,
for symmetric metrics, any combinations of k1 and k2 will
maximize the attacker’s utility as long as k1 + k2 = k′A. For
asymmetric metrics, the optimal solution requires some fixed
k∗1 and k
∗
2 with k
∗
1 + k
∗
2 = k
′
A. The values of k
∗
1 and k
∗
2 can
be efficiently computed given the degrees of V1 and V2 and
the number of their common neighbors [25].
Now, consider the attacker’s best response when breaking
ties in favor of the defender. Intuitively, the attacker will
choose the set SA that simultaneously minimizes the similarity
of the target link and minimizes the total damage C. The
next two results characterize such a best response first for
symmetric and then for asymmetric similarity metrics.
Proposition 1. For symmetric metrics, the attacker’s best
response that breaks ties in favor of the defender is: for each
pair of links (V1, wj) and (V2, wj), if one of the links is
protected, delete the other unprotected link and if both links
are unprotected, delete the link which is associated with a
smaller damage.
Proof. For each pair of links (V1, wj) and (V2, wj), if one
of the links is protected, the attacker will delete the other
unprotected link to minimize Sim(V1, V2).
When both links are not protected, we use a binary vari-
able yj to denote the attacker’s decision regarding the tuple
(V1, wj , V2), j = 1, 2, · · · , k′A. Specifically, yj = 1 means that
the attacker will delete edge (V1, wj) and yj = 0 means that
the attacker will delete (wj , V2). The attacker will minimize
the total damage C, which can be written as:
arg min
y
C =
k′A∑
j=1
cj1yj + cj2(1− yj) (4)
For symmetric metrics, the above optimization problem
is unconstrained, as every combination of k1 and k2 will
maximize the attacker’s utility. Then it’s straightforward to
obtain that the optimal solution is to set yj = 1 if and only if
cj1 − cj2 ≤ 0 for j = 1, 2, · · · , k′A.
Proposition 2. For asymmetric metrics, the attacker’s best
response that breaks ties in favor of the defender is : i) for
each pair of links (V1, wj) and (V2, wj), if one of the links
is protected, delete the other unprotected links; ii) among all
the unprotected link pairs, select k∗1 common neighbors wj in
ascending order of (cj1 − cj2) and delete the corresponding
links (V1, wj), and for the remaining wj , delete (V2, wj).
Proof. For asymmetric metrics, the attacker solves optimiza-
tion problem (4) with an extra constraint
∑k′A
j=1 yj = k
∗
1 .
Rewrite the objective as C =
∑k′A
j=1 cjyj + B, where cj =
cj1 − cj2 and B =
∑k′A
j=1 cj2 is a constant. Clearly, greedily
setting yj = 1 in ascending order of (cj1 − cj2) gives the
optimal solution.
C. Computing an Approximately Optimal Strategy for the
Analyst
Based on the attacker’s best response characterized above,
we propose two algorithms to find the defender’s strategy. The
first one, termed IDOpt (Independent Damage Optimization),
formulates the defender’s problem as a nonlinear integer
program which can be linearized using standard techniques
and whose solution yields the defender’s optimal strategy
for symmetric metrics under the independent damage ap-
proximation. The second one, termed IDRank (Independent
Damage Ranking), ranks the importance of each link based on
the accumulated damages, avoiding solving the optimization
problem and thereby allowing a significant improvement in
scalability.
a) IDOpt: For each sample, the defender is facing an
attacker strategically deleting edges over the damage graph
GiA. The challenging part is that as the underlying graph Gi is
sampled over the same node set according to some distribution,
the damage graphs can have overlapping edges (although they
are independent in the view of different types of attackers).
This makes finding the defender’s best response regarding
a single sample meaningless. Instead, the defender needs to
jointly consider all the samples.
We first show that for symmetric metrics, the defender’s
problem can be formulated as a nonlinear integer program
with linear constraints. Specifically, we use a binary variable
xijr (r = 1, 2) to denote the defender’s decision of protecting
(reliably querying) edge (wj , V ir ), where x
i
jr = 1 means the
defender choose to protect the edge and xijr = 0 otherwise.
Consider the tuple (V i1 , w
i
j , V
i
2 ), the defender has four dif-
ferent options regarding protecting the two links (V i1 , w
i
j) and
(V i2 , w
i
j). Specifically, when the defender chooses to protect
neither links, the expected damage is min{cij1, cij2}, based on
the attacker’s best response. Thus, the expected damage to the
defender regarding tuple (V i1 , w
i
j , V
i
2 ) is
cij(x
i
j1, x
i
j2) =c
i
j2x
i
j1(1− xij2) + cij1(1− xij1)xij2
+ min{cij1, cij2}(1− xij1)(1− xij2). (5)
Under the independent damage approximation, the total
expected damage to the defender is
C(x) =
K∑
i=1
Ni∑
j=1
cij(x
i
j1, x
i
j2), (6)
where N i denotes the number of common neighbors of V i1 and
V i2 and x denotes the defender’s joint decision. Then minimiz-
ing the defender’s total loss is equivalent to minimizing the
total expected damage over all samples. The defender solves
the following integer programming problem:
min
x
C(x), s.t.
K∑
i
Ni∑
j=1
(xij1 + x
i
j2) ≤ kD. (7)
The nonlinear terms involve only pairwise products of binary
decision variables. Since each such term can be linearized
using standard techniques, the optimization problem can be
cast as an integer linear program. We note that the decision
variables xijk many appear multiple times in the samples as the
critical edges may overlap in the reduced sub-graphs. However,
each xijk is counted once in the above constraint. From the
above analysis, we have the following proposition regarding
the defender’s optimal strategy.
Proposition 3. Suppose the attacker’s best response is as
specified by Proposition 1, then the solution to the integer
program (7) gives the defender’s optimal strategy.
IDOpt is summarized in Alg. 1. We also use IDOpt as
a heuristic for asymmetric metrics. Specifically, we solve
Eqn (7) to obtain the defender’s strategy while in the simulated
attacks, we let the attacker follow the strategy as stated in
Proposition 2.
Algorithm 1 IDOpt
1: for i = 1, 2, · · · ,K do
2: generate sample (Gi, HiA)
3: add cij(x
i
j1, x
i
j2) to objective . defined in Enq (5)
4: construct integer program . defined in Eqn (7)
5: solve integer program, output x . x: reliable queries
b) IDRank: When the size of the graph or the number
of samples becomes large, solving the integer program will
not scale. For this purpose, we propose a second approach
IDRank. At the high level, IDRank is guided by considering
the defender’s optimal strategy when there is only one sample.
Then IDRank will assign an importance score to each critical
edge and the edges are ranked by their accumulated impor-
tance scores. Finally, the edges with high scores are identified
as those that the defender needs to protect.
Let GA be the damage graph extracted from a sample. Let
each common neighbor wj of V1 and V2 be associated with a
weight cj = min{cj1, cj2}. Let Np be the number of common
neighbors whose weights are positive. We have the following
proposition characterizing the defender’s (analyst’s) optimal
strategy for a single attack sample.
Proposition 4. Suppose the attacker’s best response is as
specified by Proposition 1. The defender’s optimal strategy
is: 1) when KD ≥ 2Np, the defender will protect edges
(wj , V1) and (wj , V2) for wj whose weights are positive;
2) when kD < 2Np, the defender will select bkD2 c common
neighbors wj in descending order of their weights and protect
all (wj , V1) and (wj , V2) for selected wj .
Proof. When the attacker’s best response is as stated in Propo-
sition 1, the total damage is C =
∑N
j=1 cj , as the attacker
will choose the edge with smaller damage to delete for each
tuple (V1, wj , V2). Consider a common neighbor wj whose
weight cj is non-positive. Protecting one or both of (V1, wj)
and (V2, wj) will not decrease C. For a common neighbor wj
with positive weight, suppose cj1 ≤ cj2, i.e., cj = cj1 > 0. If
the defender chooses to protect edge (V1, wj), C will increase
by cj2 − cj1, which is non-negative. If the defender chooses
to protect edge (V2, wj), C will not change. If the defender
chooses to protect both edges, C will decrease by cj1, which
is positive. To minimize C, the defender’s optimal strategy is
to protect both edges. Thus, when KD ≥ 2Np, the defender
will protect edges (wj , V1) and (wj , V2) for wj whose weights
are positive. When kD < 2Np, the defender will select bkD2 c
common neighbors wj in descending order of their weights
and protect all (wj , V1) and (wj , V2) for selected wj .
Proposition 4 states that when there is a single sample, the
defender will protect the tuples (V1, wj , V2) (i.e., protect both
edges (V1, wj) and (V2, wj)) only if deleting both edges will
cause positive damage. This gives some intuition when the
defender jointly considers all the samples.
Based on this, IDRank works as follows. For each damage
graph GiA, the defender will identify those common neighbors
whose weights (i.e., cij = min{cij1, cij2}) are positive and
assign an importance score cij to both edges (w
i
j , V
i
1 ) and
(wij , V
i
2 ). After processing all the damage graphs, the defender
obtains a list of edges ranked by their importance scores, from
which the defender can pick the top kD edges to protect.
IDRank is summarized in Alg. 2.
Algorithm 2 IDRank
1: initialize a weight vector w for all possible edges (V ir , w
i
j)
2: for i = 1, 2, · · · ,K do
3: generate sample (Gi, HiA)
4: for j = 1, 2, · · · , N i do
5: if cij > 0 then . cij = min{cij1, cij2}
6: add w[(V ir , w
i
j)] by c
i
j for r = 1, 2
7: rank w in descending order
8: output top kD edges . reliable queries
VII. EXPERIMENTS
A. Datasets
a) Synthetic: We consider two synthetic data sets gener-
ated from two random graph models. Both of these two models
will generate graphs with a power-law distribution, which are
used to model a large range of social networks. The first data
set, denoted as PA, are generated from the Barabasi-Albert [1]
(or Preferential Attachment) model. Each of the graphs has
n = 500 nodes, and the average degree of each node is ∼ 10.
The second dataset is generated from the configuration model
[2], that is used to generate graphs with pre-defined degree
distributions. The generated graphs have a degree distribution
satisfying P (k) ∝ k−γ , where γ is a controllable parameter.
We set n = 500 and γ = 2.0. In the generated data set (PLD),
each node in the graphs has an average degree of around 5.
Both graph generators are implemented through SNAP [13].
b) Real networks: We consider two real social networks
from [18], denoted as TVShow and Gov, which represent
Facebook pages of two categories ( TV show and government,
respectively). The nodes represent pages, and the (undirected)
edges represent the “likes” among them. TVShow has 3892
nodes and 17262 edges, and Gov has 7057 nodes and 89, 455
edges, which is denser. We use the random-walk (with restart
probability c = 0.15) sampling approach [12] to generate
random subgraphs each having 500 nodes from TVShow and
Gov.
B. Attack and Defense Methods
We consider three attack and three defense methods. The
first attack is proposed in [25], which we term LinkDel, and it
will delete links according to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
The second attack, termed UnbiasedDel, is based on a heuristic
approach from [23]. Specifically, UnbiasedDel will delete one
of the two links (V1, w) and (V2, w) without bias in case they
are both not protected, for each common neighbor w of the
attacker’s target nodes. The third attack RandDel is motivated
by [24] where they measure the robustness of link prediction
algorithms through random perturbation on the graphs. To
simulate such random perturbation, RandDel will delete each
unprotected link (Vi, w) (i = 1, 2) with probability p = 0.5.
The first two defense methods are IDOpt and IDRank.
We also consider a third defense as a baseline, termed PPN
(Protect Potential Neighbors). PPN will protect a subset of
links randomly sampled from a set of critical links Ec, which
are links between the defender’s target node set VD and the
rest of the nodes in the network.
Evaluation metric: We evaluate the defense performance
by simulating 2000 independent attacks and measuring the
changes in the accumulated loss. Specifically, let L0 be the
defender’s accumulated loss when there is no attack. Let LA
be the defender’s loss under some attack A when the defender
cannot make any reliable queries. We use LD to denote the
loss when the defender make reliable queries according to
a certain defense strategy D. We are primarily interested in
damage prevention, which measures the amount of damage
that can be prevented by defense. Formally, we define a
damage prevention ratio DPRDA as the percentage of damage
that is prevented:
DPRDA =
LA − LD
LA − L0 ,
where D ∈ {IDOpt, IDRank,PPN} represents a defense
strategy and A ∈ {LinkDel,UnbiasDel,RandDel} denotes an
attack method. We note that a larger DPR means that the
defense strategy is more effective, and DPR is not necessarily
smaller than 1, as theoretically the attacks may decrease the
defender’s loss.
C. Vulnerable Cases
In this section, we empirically evaluate the effect of at-
tacks in different scenarios, using LinkDel as a representative
attack, and identify the vulnerable cases where the attack
has a relatively higher impact on the defender’s loss. Let
VD (respectively, VA) be the union of end-nodes appeared
in HD (respectively, HA). We thus classify the attacks by
the distributions of VD and VA. Specifically, we consider
two cases of VD, termed as clustering and sparse, where the
nodes in VD are randomly drawn from high degree nodes
and from all nodes in the network, respectively. We also
consider two cases of VA, termed targeted, where VA ⊂ VD,
and sparse, where VA are randomly drawn from all nodes
in the network, respectively. As a result, we consider four
different attack scenarios in combination: Random Sparse
Attack (RSA), Random Clustering Attack (RCA), Targeted
Sparse Attack (TSA), and Targeted Clustering Attack (TCA).
We first empirically evaluate the damage to the defender
caused by each attack. In our experiments, we keep VD fixed,
which is implemented by renumbering the node IDs in the
sample graphs. We measure the accumulated losses from 1k
simulated attacks in each attack scenarios. We define the
damage as the change in the accumulated loss before and after
the attacks. In our experiments, we use the exponential loss
function, defined as l(e) = exp(−yeβ(Sim(e)− θ)), where e
represents a node pair in HD, β is a parameter, and θ is a pre-
defined threshold. The relative quantities of the damages are
similar for other standard loss functions. We present the results
for four representative metrics (Table II ): CN, Sørensen, RA,
and Salton, that have their own features. Specifically, CN
only considers the number of common neighbors; Sørensen
and Salton can be considered as generalized CN adjusted
by node degrees; RA computes the degrees of the common
neighbors. Among these, Salton is asymmetric and the others
are symmetric.
TABLE II: The damages (%) caused by attacks in four
different attacking scenarios on TVShow and PA.
Metrics TCA RCA TSA RSA
TVShow
CN +23.524 +1.400 +3.196 +0.022
Sørensen +11.274 +0.589 +1.424 −0.002
RA +9.461 +0.101 +3.371 +0.005
Salton +22.632 +0.727 +7.695 −0.025
PA
CN +7.167 +1.072 +0.394 +0.138
Sørensen +5.292 +0.589 −0.302 +0.061
RA +17.628 +2.408 +0.952 −0.046
Salton +8.911 +1.659 +1.673 +0.3945
In general, the effects of random attacks (whether VD are
clustered or not) are almost negligible; while the targeted
attack on clustered VD causes significant damage for all
metrics. This motivates us to focus on TCA, where VD consists
of relatively high degree nodes and VA are sampled from VD.
We note that TCA models are an important class of attacks in
reality, where both the defender and the attacker are interested
in important individuals (measured by their degrees) in the
networks. While the defender wants to predict the mutual
connections among them, an attacker aims to hide a particular
relationship.
The rest of this section focuses on evaluating the perfor-
mance of our proposed defense strategies in the TCA scenario.
In our experiments, we set |VD| = 10 and consider all node
pairs in VD. Accordingly, the set of critical edges |Ec| has
a size of ∼ 5000. We sample VD from high degree nodes
such that on average there are ∼ 45% − 55% edges in HD
in the sample graphs. For the IDOpt and IDRank defense,
we generate 4000 samples to identify the important links to
protect.
D. Defense Performance under Attacks
a) Defense under LinkDel attack: We present the DPR
of the three defense methods, IDOpt, IDRank, and PPN, under
the LinkDel attack on four datasets in Fig. 2 to Fig. 5. In all
the figures, the horizontal line DPR = 0 represents attacking
without defense and DPR = 1 means the defender’s loss drops
to L0 for which there is no attack.
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Fig. 2: DPR under LinkDel attack on PA.
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Fig. 3: DPR under LinkDel attack on PLD.
In general, by making a small portion of queries reliable,
our proposed IDOpt and IDRank can alleviate much of the
damage caused by attacks, with IDRank nearly as good as
IDOpt in most cases. For example, for the CN metric on
PA dataset, making 100 reliable queries (∼ 2%) can prevent
almost 60% of the damage and 500 reliable queries (∼ 10%)
can prevent around 80% of the damage if we use our proposed
approach, whereas PPN has virtually no effect even with 20%
reliable queries. Throughout, we observe diminishing returns
to investment in reliable queries, an observation that is most
evident on the PLD dataset.
b) Defense under UnbiasDel and RandDel attacks: We
further test the defense performance under the UnbiasDel
and RandDel attacks, respectively, under the same experiment
settings. The DPR on the PA and TVShow datasets are
presented in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively. The results show
that IDOpt and IDRank can successfully limit the damage
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Fig. 4: DPR under LinkDel attack on TVShow.
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Fig. 5: DPR under LinkDel attack on Gov.
from these two additional attacks, even though they were not
explicitly designed with these in mind.
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Fig. 6: DPR under UnbiasDel attack (solid lines) and RandDel
attack (dotted lines with the corresponding color) on PA.
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Fig. 7: DPR under UnbiasDel attack (solid lines) and RandDel
attack (dotted lines with the corresponding color) on TVShow.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we initiate the study of making link prediction
robust against attacks that remove edges from the observed
network in order to hide a target link. Specifically, we endow
the analyst with the ability to make a small set of reliable
queries that return accurate results about associated edges and
cannot be manipulated by the adversary. We then model the
problem of robust link prediction in this context as a Bayesian
Stackelberg game in which the defender chooses which reli-
able queries to make, and the attacker then deletes a subset of
links. In this game, the analyst (defender) is uncertain about
both the true graph structure and the attacker’s preference
about which link to hide. We show that solving this game is
NP-Hard, but also present two approaches for approximately
solving it. Our extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates
that our robust link prediction approach is quite effective in
defending against several attacks.
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